Missiles and punishment: How to protect Ukraine amid Russia’s escalating strikes

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Missile Threat

On the night of August 26 — and well into the following morning — Ukraine endured its largest air attack since the war began. A total of 236 Russian missiles and drones struck 15 regions, hitting critical infrastructure and triggering emergency power outages across the country. The raid left seven people dead and 47 injured.

These strikes were not just another episode in the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine’s civilian population, but a stark reminder that, in the war’s third year, the Russian missile threat continues to loom over Ukrainian cities countrywide. Even residents of the capital, with its robust air defenses, are not fully shielded. While August 26 was less bad there than elsewhere, on July 8 a Russian missile struck a children’s hospital in Kyiv, killing two and injuring 32.

Despite repeated claims by Ukrainian intelligence that Russia’s long-range missile stockpiles were running low, massive strikes have remained a key tactic of Russia’s aggression since the very start of the full-scale invasion. According to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, as of August 20, 2024, Russia had launched 9,627 missiles at Ukraine since February 24, 2022, with only 2,429 intercepted.

Missile Invasion

On the eve of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Armed Forces possessed a considerable stockpile of various types of missiles (this overview is limited to those equipped with conventional warheads, though many of those were also capable of carrying nuclear payloads). Russia’s strategic bomber force was equipped with Kh-55, Kh-555 and Kh-101 long-range subsonic cruise missiles as well as Kh-22 and Kh-32 supersonic cruise missiles, while tactical aircraft carried Kh-35, Kh-38, and Kh-59 missiles. Additionally, Russia had its “secret weapon” — the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, falsely touted by Moscow’s propaganda as being hypersonic.

The Russian navy had a significant number of Kalibr cruise missile carriers, and coastal troops were armed with Oniks anti-ship missiles, which could also strike land targets. The Ground Forces’ missile brigades had completed the transition to Iskander missile systems, which are capable of launching both cruise and ballistic missiles.

Russia’s full-scale invasion on February 24 began with massive missile strikes across Ukraine. According to figures from the U.S. Department of Defense, 160 missiles were launched on the first day, primarily targeting airfields and Ukrainian air defense positions. Although some Ukrainian aircraft and air defense systems were repositioned out of the line of fire, many were destroyed on day one.

However, Ukraine quickly restored its air defense capabilities, forcing the Russian Aerospace Forces to scale back its use of aircraft over Ukrainian territory due to significant losses. Missiles, along with a small number of Orion drones and Kub loitering munitions, remained one of Russia’s few means of striking Ukrainian strategic and operational targets in the rear.

By the end of March 2022, the Pentagon estimated that Russia had launched around 1,200 missiles at Ukraine. Notably, in this phase of the war, the Iskanders were used for their intended purpose: to support advancing troop formations. An example was the Russian attack on a battery of Ukrainian heavy self-propelled “Pion” cannons near Kyiv.

As Russia's missile stockpiles began to diminish (there may have also been too few operational launchers available), older Tochka-U missile systems were brought back into use. One such Tochka-U strike on a train station in Kramatorsk in April 2022 resulted in 61 deaths.

Overall, Russian missile strikes lacked consistency. For unknown reasons, Russian forces targeted television towers in Kyiv, Rivne, and Vinnytsia. They later shifted their focus to oil depots, and then to railway power substations — but they failed to create a fuel crisis or to meaningfully disrupt rail transport.

Some strikes, however, proved highly effective, such as those on the Yavoriv training ground in the Lviv region, a barracks in Mykolaiv, and a training center in Desna in the Chernihiv Region. By early May 2022, a Ukrainian estimate claimed that Russia had only around 40% of its pre-war stocks of Iskander and Kalibr missiles left, indicating that the remaining missiles would have to be used more efficiently.

Missile Genocide

On October 10, 2022, Russia launched what at the time was its largest single missile strike on Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported 84 missiles and 24 drones — including 13 newly introduced Iranian-designed Shaheds. Ukrainian forces intercepted 43 missiles and 13 drones. The strikes damaged critical infrastructure in 12 regions and included hits in the very center of Kyiv, killing 19 and injuring 105 across the country. Many areas were left without power due to strikes on power plants and substations, with the government urging citizens to conserve electricity.

These and subsequent attacks were linked to General Sergey Surovikin’s appointment as commander of Russia’s Joint Group of Forces in the “Special Military Operation” zone. Surovikin had used similar tactics in Syria, with Russia’s Aerospace Forces targeting infrastructure — including schools, hospitals, humanitarian aid centers, bakeries, markets, and the headquarters of the Syrian Civil Defense (more commonly known as the “White Helmets”) — in opposition-controlled parts of the country. The destruction made life in these areas unbearable, leading to an increase in refugee flows and weakening the social base of the anti-Assad forces. This strategy proved effective — by 2020, the only areas still outside of Damascus' control were those under the protection of other external players, namely Turkey and the United States.

It appears that a similar strategy was chosen for Ukraine. However, unlike in Syria, where the Russian Aerospace Forces operated with impunity due to the opposition’s lack of air defense systems, the bombing campaign in Ukraine had to be limited to a select number of high-value targets.

The focus shifted to Ukraine's energy infrastructure, which consisted of large mostly Soviet-built facilities well-known to the Russian command. The probable aim was to disrupt the power supply ahead of winter, thereby triggering a new migration crisis and weakening Ukraine’s economic base. The potential deaths of ordinary Ukrainians in freezing apartment buildings were likely written off as “collateral damage.”

Between October 2022 and March 2023, mass missile strikes on Ukraine occurred more than 10 times. The initial strikes were so devastating that, according to some sources, an evacuation of the capital seemed like a real possibility. Residents of Kyiv, the Kyiv Region, and Odesa were forced to survive without electricity and heating for many hours, and in some cases, even days.

To maintain and restore Ukraine’s energy system, Kyiv’s Western partners created an “Energy Ramstein” — a consultative group similar to the one previously assembled to coordinate arms supplies. Additionally, discussions began about providing Ukraine with modern air defense systems, with a particular focus on the U.S.-made MIM-104 Patriot. However, these systems arrived too late to help counter the first wave of attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure — the last large-scale missile strike of the winter campaign took place on March 9, 2023, when Russia launched 81 missiles at Ukraine, of which only 34 were intercepted.

Missile Duel

By spring 2023, it was clear that Russia’s missile campaign had failed. Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russia’s pre-war missile stockpiles had finally been depleted; however, estimates suggested that, despite sanctions, Russia was producing 25 Kalibr missiles, 35 Kh-101 missiles, five ballistic 9M723 missiles for Iskander-M systems, and two Kinzhal missiles each month — an increase over pre-war times.

But Ukraine appeared to have an answer. Deputy Defense Minister Oleksandr Pavlyuk announced the arrival of Patriot systems in the country on April 19, 2023, and by early May, Ukrainian forces had managed to shoot down a Kinzhal missile — the type was confirmed by comparing debris photos with a missile that crashed in Russia’s Stavropol region in September 2022.

On May 16, the Ukrainian Air Force reported intercepting six Kinzhals in one day. Their target appeared to be the Patriot systems deployed in Kyiv, one of which suffered damage but was quickly repaired.

The duel between Russian missiles and Ukrainian air defense systems continued. Ukraine built a layered air defense network around the Patriot, NASAMS, IRIS-T, Hawk, Crotale, and other systems, as well as Soviet systems modified for use with Western missiles as part of the FrankenSAM project.

Russia, in turn, improved its own missiles — the Kh-101 initially had its warhead size increased at the expense of range, and an additional warhead was later added for greater destructive impact. Additionally, supersonic Kh-22 anti-ship missiles were widely used, and despite their low accuracy against ground targets, due to their high speed they were nearly impossible to intercept for most of Ukraine's air defense systems.

The Kremlin also made an effort to replenish its missile stockpiles through help from its authoritarian allies. In early 2024, debris from North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles was frequently found in Kharkiv (1, 2). However, their use was temporarily halted and only resumed in the summer, possibly due to insufficient production rates in North Korea.

The KN-23s (nicknamed “Kimscanders”) have proven unreliable — according to a Reuters report citing the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office, about half of these missiles either deviated from their course or exploded in mid-air. A separate Reuters report claimed that missiles had been delivered to Russia from Iran, although these have yet to be seen on the battlefield.

In turn, Ukraine received the first batch of long-awaited ATACMS missiles from the U.S., and they immediately proved effective in strikes on Russian helicopter bases in occupied Berdyansk and Luhansk. However, the missiles arrived too late to have a significant impact on Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive. Nevertheless, it appeared that the war had reached a certain missile parity — until Russia launched new strikes.

Missile Supremacy

In the winter of 2023–2024, Russian missile strikes seemed to be aimed at disrupting the operations of Ukraine's defense industry. It is difficult to assess the exact impact of these strikes on Ukraine’s defense production, but, for example, by April 2024, according to Volodymyr Zelensky, his country had managed to reach a production rate of 10 units of 155mm Bohdana self-propelled howitzers per month. According to military expert Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, after a series of failures, the Russians changed their tactics yet again, focusing on cutting power to Ukrainian enterprises through renewed missile strikes on energy infrastructure.

Ukraine's energy sector was thought to be prepared for the new attacks, but Russia’s approach had changed significantly compared to its 2022–2023 campaign. While earlier strikes primarily targeted distribution substations in order to disrupt the connectivity of Ukraine’s energy grid, the main targets were now power generation facilities — especially thermal and hydroelectric power plants.

This shift was partly due to Russia no longer being able to sustain the previous scale and frequency of missile strikes. While in 2022–2023 more than 100 missiles could be launched at Ukraine simultaneously, during the July 8, 2024, strike, for example, the number was estimated at “over 40.” It took more than a month and a half, starting from July 8, to accumulate the 127 missiles used in the record-breaking strike on August 26, 2024.

Soviet-era power plants are relatively easy targets: they are large facilities, and their locations and structure are well known to the MoD in Moscow. This allowed Russia to disable much of Ukraine’s power generation with fewer missile strikes, potentially causing severe consequences.

Russia also continued to improve its arsenal, employing stealthy Kh-69 missiles. However, the use of other missiles, such as true hypersonic Zircons, has been unsuccessful.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s missile interception rate has declined due to depleting air defense missile stockpiles and delays in U.S. military aid at a time when Russia is making increasing use of difficult-to-intercept ballistic missiles.

According to the aforementioned data provided by Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Oleskandr Syrskyi, the interception rate for Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles is 4.3% (56 out of 1,300 launched), while for Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles it is 25% (28 out of 111). For sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles, the interception rate stands at 49.5% (443 out of 894), and for air-launched Kh-555/Kh-101 cruise missiles, it reaches 78% (1,440 out of 1,846).

Furthermore, Russia’s use of reconnaissance drones capable of penetrating Ukrainian territory by more than 100 km has improved the accuracy of its ballistic missile strikes. Russia has managed to hit valuable military assets such as HIMARS systems and Patriot batteries. Additionally, strikes on Ukrainian airfields, even those located dozens or over a hundred of kilometers from the front lines, have also become more successful.

Ukrainian forces have retaliated, using newly received long-range ATACMS missiles to target Russian air defense positions in occupied territories, particularly in Crimea (1, 2, 3). However, an ongoing ban on using these missiles against internationally recognized Russian territory significantly limits Ukraine’s capabilities in the growing missile standoff, effectively giving Russian forces an advantage.

Missile Prospects

Russia continues to ramp up its production of long-range missiles. According to an estimate by Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, HUR, 50 Kh-101 cruise missiles roll off the production line each month — which is enough for 1–2 large-scale strikes. According to the Financial Times, Russia’s Kh-101 production now stands eight times higher than pre-war levels.

In January 2024, HUR estimated Russia’s monthly production at 115–130 “strategic” missiles (both cruise and ballistic), as well as 100–115 operational-tactical missiles (like the Kh-31 and Kh-59), which are used in particular to strike Ukrainian air defense systems.

These production levels are made possible by the ongoing import of sanctioned components. The New York Times reported the discovery of American-made components in the missile that hit the Okhmatdyt children’s hospital in Kyiv on July 8, 2024. A report by the Yermak-McFaul sanctions policy working group also identified 46 foreign components in the Kinzhal missile.

The Insider has repeatedly reported on the methods and routes that are used to circumvent sanctions on key components of Russia’s missile production supply chain (1, 2, 3). But so long as Western sanctions policies remain incapable of preempting smugglers’ shift to new means after old schemes are shut down, the missile threat to Ukraine will persist — even if all of Kyiv's air defense supply requests were to be met, which is still far from the case.

John Hardie, deputy director of the Russian program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), told The Insider that while the U.S. and its Western allies could more effectively monitor the enforcement of sanctions, stopping the flow of missile components entirely is impossible:

“Russia has been largely successful in circumventing Western export controls on microelectronics and other military-related components, though it has probably had to pay more for components or accept lower-quality components in some cases. Many of these shipments go through China and other ‘friendly countries.’ The U.S. government and other Western countries could probably be more effective in enforcing their sanctions and export controls, but at the end of the day, I doubt we will be able to completely stop these components from reaching Russia.”

According to President Volodymyr Zelensky, 25 Patriot systems or their equivalents are needed to fully protect Ukraine’s skies from Russian missiles and aircraft. The minimum required to cover key cities is seven systems.

At the NATO summit in Washington this past July, Ukraine was promised four Patriot systems and one SAMP-T, but with the notable exception of Germany, partner countries have been slow in delivering on their promises. And even if the necessary air defense systems are put in place, Ukraine may face a shortage of the missiles needed to keep them operational — currently, only 500 PAC-3 anti-ballistic missiles are produced each year worldwide, and plans to increase that number to 750 have been hindered by a shortage of guidance heads (new production lines for these will not be operational until 2027). As a result, Ukrainian aircraft have had to take on air defense roles, shooting down Russian missiles and drones during raids — a necessity which, it appears, has already led to the loss of Ukraine’s first F-16.

Another effective way to counter missile strikes is to target the carriers on the ground at airfields and bases. The Insider columnist Colby Badhwar described this strategy as “shooting the archer, not the arrow,” and expressed frustration that the U.S. and other Western partners have yet to lift the ban on long-range missile strikes on Russian territory. Missile expert Dr. Jeffrey Lewis echoes Badhwar’s view, noting that Ukraine’s low interception rate of ballistic missiles shows that “shooting the archers” would be more effective.

In a comment to The Insider, independent Norwegian defense analyst Thord Are Iversen pointed out that to fully protect Ukraine’s airspace is an impossible task:

“The challenge here is that Ukraine is a big country and as missiles for the S-300s have started to run out, there simply aren't enough Western systems available to replace them one by one — even in a best case scenario when it comes to donations. The West is also struggling to increase production. This is why strikes outside Kyiv often inflict more damage than those directed at the capital — and there will always be gaps the Russians can exploit. Where to deploy the air defense systems they have is a constant dilemma for the Ukrainians, where tradeoffs always have to be made.”

Iversen also suggests that it will take considerable time before F-16s can play a significant role in Ukraine’s air defense. He warns against oversimplifying the connection between lifting restrictions on the use of long-range weapons supplied by Ukraine's allies and the impact on Russia's missile strike capabilities. For example, strategic missile-carrying bombers like the Tu-95 will still be able to hit Ukraine from far beyond the range of Western systems. Ukrainian attempts to counter this threat with the use of long-range drones have been hindered by the simple fact that Russian aircraft can usually evade slow-moving UAVs.

In addition, Ukrainian anti-ship missiles such as the R-360 “Neptune” are being used against ground targets in Russia, and Ukraine is also developing other capabilities. . Ukrainian-made missiles will, of course, not be bound by the restrictions imposed by Kyiv’s Western partners. However, the question remains as to whether Ukraine's military-industrial complex — forced to cope with regular attacks and power outages — has sufficient resources to withstand a full-scale missile standoff.